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Abstract 
 
 This paper examines the movement against water privatization.  First I trace the 
development of social struggle in Ghana. I then outline the issues in the debate over water 
privatization.  Finally I describe development in the movement against water privatization, and 
their significance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Introduction:  The global debate over the privatization of basic resources. 
 
 The protests of Seattle Washington 1999 highlighted the growing dissatisfaction with neo-
liberal economic policies that have failed to provide sustainable development and have a caused a 
corresponding drop in the quality of life in workers and disenfranchised groups around the world.  
Global capitalist interests (multinationals and the states that support them) constantly expand into 
new terrain, most recently into the social services, including water.  The infringement of the 
private sector with their profit-based motives into the social services has sparked concern and 
protests in both developing and industrialized countries.  Water in particular is becoming a charged 
political issue. 
 In Cochabamba, Bolivia the attempted privatization the regions water supply sparked a 
struggle in which workers, farmers, professionals, environmentalists and students united, fighting 
intense street battles and blockades, successfully forcing the Bolivian government to rescind its 
contract with the multinational Bechtel and return water to the public sector.1
 Hence the proposed privatization of the water sector in Ghana has led to speculation on the 
potential for the mobilization of he diverse contingencies that will be affected by the deal.2  
 Ghana was the first sub-Saharan African country to win independence in 1957, generating 
excitement among pan-africanists, nationalists and socialists that the newly independent 
government led by Kwame Nkrumah would successfully wrest the economic and political life 
from neo-colonial interests.  Nonetheless in the decades since independence Ghana, like the 
majority of formerly colonized countries has failed to break from its subordinate relationship with 
international capital.3  Since the early 1980s Ghana has undergone Structural Adjustment Programs 
(SAPs), which includes the liberalization of the economy in the interests of foreign investors and 
the slashing of government expenditure.  The privatization of water is a conditionality of SAPs in 
many developing countries, particularly “Highly Indebted Poor Countries” (HIPC) such as Ghana.4
 The prominence of the debate over water privatization raises several questions.  What 
affect does the attempt to privatize a basic life-sustaining resource such as water have on the 
legitimacy of government to represent its citizen’s interests?  What types of coalitions form around 
                                                 
1 Raquel Guiterez, Alvaro Garcia and Luis Tapia. “La Forma Multitud de la Politica de las Necesidades Vitales.” In El 
Retorno de la Bolivia Plebeya. (La Paz: Muela de Diablo, 2000) 
2 Gumisai Mutume. “Resistance to World Bank privatization (water, etc) in Ghana.”  
(http://www.fpcn-global.org/pipermail/africa-news/2000-November/000013.html, retrieved 9/12/01). P.1. 
3 Kwame A. Ninsin. “Introduction: Thirty-Seven Years of development Experience.” In The State Development and 
Politics in Ghana. eds Emmanuel Hansen and Kwame A. Ninsin (London: CONDESRIA, 1989) p. 1 
4 Sarah Grusky. “IMF Forces African Countries to Privatize Water”. 
(http://afjn.cua.edu/Water%20Privatization, retrieved 9/12/01), p. 1. 
 
the issue of water privatization and what political potential do they embody?  Additionally, what 
role, if any, can a movement addressing the issue of water privatization have in creating 
awareness, links and mobilization around related societal issues?  The movement against water 
privatization in Ghana is in its initial phases, however trends are emerging which suggest possible 
answers to these questions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Methodology 
 
Secondary Sources: 
 I utilized several books that covered import aspects in the history of social movements, 
structural adjustment and water quality and availability in Ghana.  I used sources available to me at 
the University of Legon bookstore, later supplementing these with materials recommended and 
loaned from an organizer in the water campaign.  Though I by no means covered the full available 
published literature related to the topic of social movements in Ghana I was able to develop an 
understanding of certain key periods. 
 Since the privatization of water and the movement against doing so is a recent and current 
phenomenon I used newspaper articles and editorials that I collected over the semester pertaining 
to the subject.  This was helpful in following developments in the privatization process and the 
debate, though again as I only arrived in the country in September I was not able to review the 
complete amount of material available through articles.  I was however able to review some back 
articles in publications that give special attention to the issue of water privatization such as the 
Public Agenda. 
 I was also given documents pertaining to the goals and stances of the Coalition and related 
organizations, which gave some context to understanding the dynamics of the forming movement. 
 I additionally watched a video of the conference on water privatization held in May of 2001 
where the Ghana Coalition Against the Privatization of Water was formed.  This was important in 
giving me a sense of important events that occurred which I was unable to observe firsthand. 
 
 
Primary Sources: 
 I relied primarily on interviews, conversations and observations to understand the 
movement forming around the issue of water privatization.  I actually began by visiting several 
government agencies involved in the restructuring process including the Restructuring Secretariat 
of the Water Resource Center, the Ghana Water Company and the Accra Metropolitan Authority.  
This had no bearing on the movement against privatization itself.  From one of these visits I was 
able to obtain the contact information of ISODEC, a Non-Governmental Organisation that is 
playing a prominent role in the coalition.  From 2 members of ISODEC I was given the contact 
information of another organizer in the campaign against water privatization, with whom I was 
able to attend a small neighbourhood meeting of concerned residents of Madina on water 
privatization, where I was introduced to other activists involved in the campaign. This included a 
student activist, who informed me of a student meeting at Legon on the issue of water 
privatization, which I attended.  There I had the opportunity of meeting other students involved in 
the issue, two of whom I later interviewed.  I also watched a discussion on campus in which 
covered the issue of water privatization where I was able to gain a first hand sense of student 
sentiments on the subject.  I additionally interviewed members of the Christian Coalition and the 
TUC, to get a sense of the positions of certain important potential players in the struggle over 
water privatization, namely religious groups, labour, and NGOs. 
 
 
Methodological Issues: 
 
 I was severely limited by time.  Though I discovered that observation was the best way to 
understand the positions, potentials and problems of the developing movement I was only able to 
observe one neighbourhood meeting, which was a new association hence small, and one student 
meeting which occurred during exams, therefore also small.  Though it was helpful to interview a 
member of the TUC leadership, it would have been more pertinent to attend workers meetings on 
water privatization (many of which occurred in October) to understand mobilization among the 
rank and file, however that was not possible this month.  Likewise, though I was able to talk to a 
couple religious leaders I would have gained a more well –rounded view of the role of religious 
associations if I could have also talked with members and leaders of the smaller churches and 
mosques.  During the period in which I conducted the investigation there was a lull in activity so I 
was also not able to attend any water rallies that were recently organized in certain communities.  
To fill in the gaps I relied on the accounts of activists involved in the organisation of these events. 
 Due to time limitations I decided to focus the study on the Accra area.  Although water 
privatization affects all major urban areas there have only been small developments in other cities 
to this point.  Similarly, though the rural areas are affected by the privatization deal, rural water 
systems themselves are not up for privatization, so far there has been little political activity in these 
areas. 
 I have made no attempt to be objective or politically detached from the issue at stake.  My 
interest in water privatization was formed my association with the Coalition in Defense of Water 
and Life (La Coordinadora de Defensa del Agua y la Vida) in Bolivia, the coalition that formed to 
defeat water privatization in Cochabamba. 
 In any case I am not analyzing whether or not water should be privatized but the movement 
forming in opposition.  I explained my position and activities in Bolivia to those I spoke with.  I 
believe this helped clarify that I was gathering this information in hopes of producing something 
slightly helpful to those concerned with the issue of water, not in portraying the coalition in any 
way that would be harmful to it. 
 My questions varied greatly on the context of the interview and altered over the course of 
the study.  However the basic points I sought to discuss were: 
 
¾ When and how did you/your organisation first get involved in the coalition against water 
privatization? 
¾ Why did you feel it was important to get involved? 
¾ What is the value of the presence of your sector/organisation in the coalition? 
¾ Are you a member of any other organizations?  Or have you been involved in any other 
campaigns/political activities? 
¾ What discussions or activities concerning water privatization have you/your organisation 
been involved in? 
¾ What potential do you see for mobilization around this issue among your 
sector/organisation? 
¾ What other organizations/individuals have you collaborated with in organizing discussions 
or actions around the issue of water privatization? 
¾ Have you made any attempt to contact people or organizations concerned with the issue or 
water privatization in other countries? 
 
Additional questions for campaign organisers: 
 
¾ Which social constituencies do you feel are most critical to incorporate into the campaign? 
¾ What strategies do you use to promote awareness on the issue of water privatization and 
mobilize different sectors/individuals/organizations? 
¾ How is the coalition structured? 
¾ What fund-raising methods do you use? 
¾ How do you utilize the media? 
¾ How is the political climate conducive or not to the campaign water privatization at this 
point? 
¾ Has the coalition made any attempts been made to connect water privatization to other 
issues? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A BRIEF POLITICAL HISTORY OF GHANA 
 
 To understand the context of a movement against the privatization of water it is necessary 
to examine the political and economic evolution of Ghana, giving attention to the following: 
 
1. The tension between the interests of international capital, the interests of Ghanaian 
citizens, and (after independence) the role of the state in this equation. 
2. The battle for political and economic control between the “big men” and “small boys”5 
and 
3. The composition, tactics and alliances of the left wing in Ghana. 
 
 
Colonialism and Independence Movements 
 
 Since the advent of the slave trade and later British colonial rule the economic and political 
processes of the area that is now Ghana have been defined by the interests of international 
capitalism.6
 British colonial powers arranged the Gold Coast economy to serve as a source of raw 
materials (principally gold and cocoa) to feed growing industries in Europe.  Investment into 
infrastructure and social services was kept to the bare minimum required for the functioning of the 
economy and the colonial government.  Within the colonial framework some traditional 
authorities, successful business men and cocoa farmers and those with access to higher education 
arose to form an elite class.7
 Likewise, the demand for independence surfaced among several distinct social classes.  On 
the one hand were the educated elite and business men who wanted independence so they could 
rise to the economic and political status they believed was due to them.  Members o this 
intelligensia formed the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) in 1947 to agitate for “the 
attainment of full self – government in the shortest possible time”.8  The UGCC subsequently 
invited Kwame Nkrumah, a young lawyer educated in the United States and England and involved 
in pan-African circles, to act as the general secretary. 
 However the strength of the independence movement lay in the increasing numbers of 
primary school graduates.  Basic education was essential to their political formation for several 
reasons including the acquisition of the common language English creating a stronger sense of 
                                                 
5 *The terms “big men” and “small boys” refer to the social status of the wealthy and working classes, respectively.  
Paul Nugent.  Big Men, Small Boys and Politics in Ghana. (Accra: Asempa Publishers, 1995). 
6 Walter Rodney.  How Europe Underdeveloped Africa. (Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1972) 
7 Dennis Austin.  Politics in Ghana: 1946-1960.  (London: Oxford University Press, 1964) 
8 Ibid 7, p.7 
national unity.  Graduates also formed scholars unions, youth movements and literary and debating 
societies.  Here discussions arose concerning local and national politics, and from these circles a 
grew a “new a political class” and an “anti-chief, anti-colonial movement”.  In this manner a 
nationalistic independence movement grew far more rapidly than the colonial administration or the 
educated elite had predicted.9
 Several economic crises in both rural and urban areas also contributed to the fall of colonial 
rule.  During the 1940s a blight of the cocoa trees caused a crisis in which farmers were forced to 
cut large portions of their crop, a policy that many desperate farmers viewed suspiciously, leading 
to their ready acceptance of UGCC  demands for independence.  At the same time in the cities, a 
shortage of imports caused prices to rise on a range of goods while the real wages dropped.  Many 
held the United Africa Company and other European trading firms as responsible for these 
developments, and began to boycott non-essential imports, which after several months developed 
into riots against foreign owned businesses in 1948.10
 Colonial authorities held UGCC leaders responsible for the riots although at this juncture 
events were entirely outside their control.  Nonetheless the detainment of UGCC leaders increased 
their popularity farther than their campaigning had succeeded in doing to that point.  The riots did 
exacerbate differences between the UGCC and Nkrumah resulting in the removal of Nkrumah as 
General Secretary.  The UGCC allied with certain chiefs worked for constitutional reform.  
Nkrumah continued to develop a following among the youth and founded the Convention Peoples 
Part (CPP) in 1950.  After an ensuing conflict during the writing of the constitution and Nkrumah’s 
imprisonment the CPP won the first national elections of 1951, defeating the opposition again in 
1954 and 1956.  Full independence was achieved in 1957.11
 
The First Republic 
 
 The CPP period, defined by its nationalist politics and experimentation in state capitalism, 
set the framework against which future development policy and political movements emerged.12
 Nkrumah’s development strategy aimed at increasing Ghana’s economic strength and 
sovereignty through industrialization and the stronger integration of the economy.  Beginning in 
1960 Nkrumah brought large portions of the commercial and manufacturing systems under state 
control, in the same period entering into a relationship with the IMF and World Bank to finance 
the Volta River Project and other projects.  The CPP however, refused to cooperate with the 
                                                 
9 Ibid 7 
10 Ibid 7 
11 Ibid 7 
12 Ibid 3, p.4 
conditionalities attached to the loans received as doing as conflicted with their development 
policy.13
 After independence government officials used the state as the principal tool of capitalist 
accumulation.  Indeed the subordination of the economy as a whole to foreign capitalists made the 
development of the capitalist class by any other fashion impossible.14  This occurred despite the 
fact that the ruling coalition upon election was drawn from the “verandah boys” who displaced the 
business elite and intelligencia, and that they had gained popularity on the basis that they held the 
same interests as common people.15
 After independence Nkrumah altered the constitution to allow for one party rule, hence 
equating the party with the state.16  The state was the largest employer and the TUC and other 
parties were thus incorporated into the party.  This allowed for a great deal of control by the state 
over workers, allowing them to tax and reduce wages.  Wages in real terms fell after 1964, 
however there was little resulting strike activity with real political implications apart from the 
railway and harbor workers in 1961.17  
 
 
Liberalization and Class Conflict 
 The “big men” had their payback when the NLC overthrow Nkrumah and the CPP in a CIA 
supported coup in 1966.  the NLC consisted of an alliance of chiefs, businessmen, successful 
cocoa farmers, senior civil servants, judges and foreign business interests, and was carried out by 
senior army officers.18  The NLC proclaimed they would reverse Nkrumah’s policies of state 
development and implement the “Rehabilitation Program” of the IMF.  However despite the 
introduction of certain measures such as the devaluation of the cedi and the liberalization of trade, 
the reduction of government spending, spending in civil and public services and the privatization 
of some public enterprises, the NLC failed to significantly alter the role of the state as the principle 
economic actor and means of accumulation.  This discrepancy between policy and practise was 
due in part to internal divisions of interests, but also to the strong backlash from students and 
workers to these policies.  The NLC was forced to open elections in which the Progress Party (PP) 
under Buis came to power in 1969.19
 
                                                 
13 Kwesi Jonah. “Changing Relation Between the IMF and the Government of Ghana 1960-1987.” In The State 
Development and Politics in Ghana. eds. Emmanuel Hansen and Kwame A. Ninsin (London: CODESRIA, 1989), p. 
97-98. 
14 Kwame A. Ninsin. “State, Capital and Labour Relations, 1961-1987.” In The State Development and Politics in 
Ghana. eds Emmanuel Hansen and Kwame A. Ninsin (London: CODESRIA, 1989), p. 16. 
15 Ibid 5, p.6 
16 Ibid 7 
17 Ibid 14, p. 23-24. 
18 Ibid 5, p.8 
19 Ibid 13, p. 102 
 In order to prevent the same problem with internal political differences interfering the 
implementation of the IMF stabilization program, the IMF and World Bank reorganized 
government decision-making bodies.  However the PP faced such strong opposition they were 
unable to implement these policies before their overthrow, even though they attempted to outlaw 
strikes and later the TUC itself.20
 The PP were overthrown in a coup by the National Redemption Council, later known as the 
Supreme Military Council led by General I.K. Acheampong.  The SMC policies such as the 
devaluation of the cedi.  However their indigenization policies led to no real solutions for 
workers.21   The economy worsened, in part from the oil crisis of 1974, workers wages dropped in 
the face of increasing inflation.  Strikes escalated in this period, in number and duration, supported 
by students nationwide.  The professional classes also allied themselves through the Peoples 
Movement for Freedom and Justice demonstrating the de-legitimacy of government through all 
sections of society.  Labour had been fighting for over a decade and was strong both 
organisationally and politically.  The ruling classes were further weakened by the Armed Forces 
Liberation Council (AFRC) coup in  1979. The return to civilian rule under Limann of the Progress 
Party did little to abate the crisis.22
 The extent of de-legitimacy of government, and the heightened class conflict created a 
situation with the greatest potential for social change in Ghanaian history, yet no social movement 
with the capacity to harness and channel this energy existed at this juncture.23
 
The Rawlings Period 
 On December 31, 1981 units of the armed forces, led by Flt. Lt. Jerry Rawlings overthrew 
the PP, establishing themselves as the People’s National Defense Council (PNDC).  Rawlings 
announced the change of government over the radio, explaining that the transition was not to be 
viewed as a coup but a revolution.  In the first unstable days he immediately sought to solidify 
support among the lower ranks of the armed forces, workers, radicals and the peasantry.24
 The PNDC initiated Workers Defense Committees (WDCs) and the Peoples Defense 
Committees (PDCs) to operate on the workplace and community levels respectively, with the 
charge of developing the revolution from below.  Workers used WDCs as a vehicle to defend their 
interests in the workplace and attack management for their corrupt and anti-labor practices.  WDCs 
operated alongside the existing trade union structures, sometimes in cooperation or conflict, 
depending on individual cases.  These developments led to the formation of the Association of 
                                                 
20 Zaya Yeebo.  Ghana: The Struggle for Popular Power; Rawlings: Saviour or Demagogue.  (London: New Beacon 
Books, 1991) p. 14. 
21 Ibid. 14, p.28 
22 Ibid 20, p.22 
23 Ibid 20 p. 24  
24 Ibid 5 p. 40-42 
Local Unions (ALU) by militant labour leaders who subsequently took over the TUC forcing the 
resignation of the labour leadership whom they accused of being corrupt, bureaucratic and 
undemocratic.25  WDCs also successfully took over two factories, the Ghana Textile Printing 
Company Limited and the Juapong Textiles Limited, in response to the threatened retrenchment of 
thousands of workers. 26
 These actions differ in nature and form from previous labour struggles.  Through the 
WDCs works had a tool which facilitated the “independence, autonomy and militancy of labour”.  
Workers did not rely merely on strikes, but engaged in mass mobilization, direct confrontation, and 
collective actions of a political, anti-imperialist nature.  Initially the PNDC was obliged to support 
to these struggles.27
 Also central to the PNDC program was the campaign against kalabule, the corrupt 
professional and business classes who had capitalized on their positions in previous regimes to 
accumulate wealth at the expense of the masses.  National Investigation Committees (NICs) 
formed to investigate anyone with over 50,000 cedis in savings, and the Citizens Vetting 
Committees (CVCs) were charged with probing the actions of those whose lifestyles could not be 
readily explained.  The CVCs had the power to try and sentence, with Rawlings as the only body 
of appeal.  The attack on the kalabule served to weaken the strength and confidence of the upper 
classes, while cementing their antagonistic relationship with the Rawlings regime whom they 
viewed as usurpant “small boys”. 28
 The end of 1982 marks the transition in the political stance and policies of the PNDC, 
which was to drastically alter its relationship to labour.  Initial signs of their changing discourse on 
people’s power occurred when the PNDC renamed the P/WDCs Committees in Defense of the 
Revolution (CDRs) and incorporated them under their own authority.  P/WDCs additionally lost 
their autonomy in the workplace with regards to management.  Interim Management Committee 
(IMCs) which had sprung up n workplaces to give workers decision making capacity in their 
corporations were turned into Joint Consultative Committees which embodied no real power.29  
The PNDC’s treatment of the Pioneer Food Cannery struggle and the dissolution of the ICC-
WDCs at a critical juncture in the dispute exemplifies their increasing reluctance to back the 
struggles of working people.30  PNDC policy changes facilitated the demobilization of the left and 
labour and opened the door for the implementation of SAP. 
 
 
                                                 
25 Ibid 5, p. 62 
26 Yao Graham.  “From GTP to Assene: Aspect of Industrial Working Class Struggles in Ghana 1982-1986” in The 
State Development and Politics in Ghana. ed.s Emmauel and Kwame A. Ninsin (London: CODESRIA, 1989), p. 52 
27 Ibid 13, p.32. 
28 Ibid 5, p. 56-57 
29 Ibid 5, p. 34-35 
30 Ibid 26, p. 65-66 
 In 1983 and PNDC implemented a harsh structural adjustment policy while claiming that 
economic reform was their own idea and in line with the revolution.  The PNDC used the food 
shortages, coup attempts and the influx of Ghanaians expelled from Nigeria to justity the nend for 
new economic policies.31
 SAP seeks to reduce the role of the state and liberalize economic regulations to make the 
economy attractive to foreign investors.  SAP measures include the devaluation of the cedi, 
increasing government revenue through retrenchment of workers, phasing out subsidies on social 
services and introducing fees on these services, privatizing government run services, reducing 
trade barriers and raising interest rates.32
 Such measures obviously gain little popularity among the working and poor who deal with 
higher unemployment rates, and rising prices, particularly of imports.  However the weakened 
working class was unable to successfully resists these measures.  Workers feared to raise their 
voices in opposition because during retrenchments militant workers were the first to go.  
Additionally, the “old guard” regained power over the TUC in the previous elections.  While the 
reinstated leaders had less ties and obligations to the PNDC. Freeing them to be critical of ERP 
measures, they returned to methods such as collective bargaining to defend traditional workers 
demands.33  Additionally, the PNDC increasingly used force against mobilizing workers.  The 
PNDC was forced to step back on the issue of the abolition of leave allowances, when the rank the 
file was up in arms and the TUC declared a national strike.  However this incident demonstrates 
that workers were back to using the trade unions, and the trade unions used negotiation not 
confrontation in their relationship with government.34
 When Rawlings came into power he began a discourse on the meaning of democracy, 
advocating that democracy was more than elections but involved people influencing the decision 
making process.  This idea resonated among Ghanaian working people who had seen little change 
in the material conditions of life, or the reflections of their interests in policy during the series of 
elected governments and military regimes since the 1966 coup.  The claim to direct democracy 
was legitimized to the population in part through the proliferation of the Defense Committees and 
other civil society organizations in 1982, despite the fact that the decision making process was 
based in Accra and the actual PNDC consisted of 7 members, 4 of them military officials. 35
 Over time Rawlings discourse altered from “you the people” to “we the PNDC” as the 
catalyst in the revolution.36  The murders of three high court judges and a retired army officer, 
while they could not be directly linked to the PNDC raised questions on the nature of the regime.  
                                                 
31 Ibid 5, p. 
32 Akilagpa Sawyerr.  The Political Dimension of Structural Adjustment Programmes in Sub-Saharan Africa. (Accra: 
Ghana Universities Press. 1990) p. 21-22 
33 Ibid 5, p. 147-150 
34 Ibid 5, p. 151. 
35 Ibid 5, p. 47-48 
36 Ibid 5, p. 49 
As time went on the Rawlings period was marked by political prisoners, disappearances, 
executions, censorship of the press and the restriction of civil liberties, leading to what became 
known as the “culture of silence”, the fear of oppositional forces to speak or act out against the 
PNDC government.37  Then, in 1989 developments abroad and nationally inspired a push for a 
return to democratic rule.  The collapse of the Soviet Union and of numerous dictatorships in 
Africa gave hope to PNDC restrictions on religious institutions and the press.  A broad based 
coalition consisting of elements of the left and right formed the Movement for Freedom and Justice 
(MFJ) in August of 1990.38  The PNDC, taking stock of its electoral potential agreed to open up 
for elections.  The electoral period brought the revival of the two traditional political tendencies, of 
Nkrumah and Busia to life.  However the PNDC was able to use its position both to prevent 
political activity by the other parties in the initial stages, and to use government resources in the 
campaign.  The PNDC/NDC were also accused of rigging the elections, however their success also 
hinges on the oppositions failure to offer alternatives to the fundamental PNDC policies, namely 
SAPs.39
 Between the return to electoral politics and the defeat of the NDC in the 2000 elections the 
greatest challenge to the Rawlings regime were the Ku me Preko protests against value added taxes 
(VAT) in 1995, in which thousands filled the streets of Accra and Kumasi.  The VAT protests 
marked an explosion of anger against the decline in living standards of for working people as a 
result of neo-liberal economic policies.40  The Rawlings government was forced to tread more 
carefully in the implementation of other programs to hold power through the 1996 elections. 
 It is worth reiterating certain developments of the Rawlings period that have bearing on the 
political scene of Ghana today. 
 
1. Left forces suffered serious setbacks due to the suppressive nature of the regime. 
2. The believed necessity of removing any vestiges of the PNDC from power has resulted 
in the focus of political activity on electoral politics. 
3. The labour movement was weakened in part from the mass retrenchments, and the 
labour leadership has focused on gaining rights within the existing framework (i.e. 
instead of protesting a labour cutback, negotiating for severance pay for affected 
workers). 
4. Despite the compliance of earlier regimes with the IMF and World Bank, the Rawlings 
regime was most successful in reorganizing the economy through SAP. 
 
                                                 
37 Ibid 20 p. 240 
38 Ibid 5 p. 186-197 
39 Ibid 5 p. 216 
40 Akoto Ampaw.  “ The State of the Nation:  Rumblings on the Labour Front.” In Ghana:  The Ku me Preko 
Demonstrations. ed. by Napolean Abdulai (London: ARIB, 1995) p. 21 
The move to privatize water results from the neo-liberal economy and it is within this political and 
economic framework that a movement against water privatization must operate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WATER:  COMMODITY OR SOCIAL GOOD? 
 
The Context of the Debate 
 The move to privatize water emerges as part of a growing trend in neo-liberal economics in 
which multinational find it most profitable to expand into already existing public markets, 
including the profitable social services.41
 The IMF and World Bank facilitate this process by making the privatization of water a 
condition for the ability to access much needed loans.  This is the case in many HIPC countries in 
African including Ghana.42
 The pending privatization of water in Ghana has caused the future of water management to 
develop into a heated national debate, and stakes are high.  Currently, water distribution is uneven 
and inadequate, particularly in low-income and rural communities.  Women and children are 
disproportionately affected by this situation as the collection of water falls on their shoulders.  
Poor drinking water accounts for 70 percent of diseases in Ghana, and the inadequate treatment of 
sewage causes a plethora of environmental problems.43
 The NPP government asserts that privatization would improve this situation because 
foreign companies would bring much needed capital for investment into the improvement and 
expansion of water services, and that transferring management into the private sector would 
greatly increase efficiency.44  The government attempts to reassure skeptics that this is not an 
outright sale of the Ghana Water Company Limited (GWC) but a temporary lease (Private Sector 
Participation (PSP) or Public Private Partnership (PPP).)45
 Opponents of the privatization deal argue that PSP or PPP amount to the same thing as 
outright privatization, and will only exacerbate existing inequalities in water distribution.46  The 
basis for these arguments will be discussed below. 
 
The Contract and its Implications: 
 The Ghana Water Restructuring Project (GWRP) entails the division of the urban water 
sector into Business Units A and B, whose management will fall to 2 of 9 multinational 
corporations in the bidding.47  As part of the restructuring process the rural water sector was placed 
under the control of the Community Water Supply Agency.  Expansion and improvement of 
services in rural communities will depend on their ability to provide 10-15 percent of initial capital 
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cost and then “normal operating fees.”48  The sewage system was also partitioned from the GWC, 
and transferred to the Metropolitan Assemblies.49  This means the incoming companies are only 
responsible for service provision in the more developed sectors of the water company namely 
sewage and rural water will remain in government hands, who will which no longer have the 
benefit of subsidies from the urban sector.  Instead all profits made in urban water provision may 
be used at the discretion of the incoming companies to finance other business operations.50
 No provisions within the contract require the incoming multinationals to raise funds to 
invest in the poor and inadequate infrastructure (pipelines, pumping capacity, water treatment, etc).  
instead, the government of Ghana will raise 500 million dollars from international financial 
institutions creating an Operating Investment Fund (OIF).  The incoming corporations will finance 
all operations from the OIF and earnings from tariff increases.51  Tariffs increases for Ghanaians is 
inevitable due the implementation of tariff increases over a 5-year period to achieve “full cost 
recovery”.  This does not however ensure the expansion of water services considering the contract 
gives multinationals control over investment decisions, granting them the ability to neglect 
expansion into areas that will not reap profits.  The incoming companies profits are further ensured 
by an “automatic tariff adjustment formula”, which protects them in cases of inflation or changes 
in the exchanged rate.52
 Viewing the track record of these multinationals international provides a gauge of their 
likelihood to improved efficiency.  In fact, the privatization of water has decreased efficiency in a 
number of developing and industrialized countries where such restructuring has taken place.  This 
is largely due to the fact that only 5 multinational corporations dominate the private water sector, 
effectively limiting competition. These corporations also have a record of problems with 
corruption, lack of transparency and secrecy.53  The implications of this are already apparent in 
Ghana from the undemocratic and secretive manner in which the privatization process is being 
carried out.54
 Hence, the conditions of the GWRP itself, and a review of privatization deals in other 
countries effectively disproves the governments claim that privatization will result in improved 
efficiency and financial capability.  What is apparent is that the multinationals are guaranteed a 
profitable, risk free acquisition.55  The government of Ghana does stand to benefit from the loans 
they will access upon the completion of the restructuring process as well as the ability to improve 
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budget balances, however these are no long term answers for Ghana’s economic crisis. Meanwhile, 
Ghanaian citizens will pay dearly for any improvements in the existing infrastructure, with no 
pending expansion of services, and more importantly, the majority of the population will not be 
able to afford piped water.  Moreover, once such a deal is reached citizens have little recourse to 
rescind the contract without facing costly lawsuits. Though the contracts are intended to last 10 
and 30 years, the dismantling of the companying and the lay-off of public utility workers 
demonstrates the permanency of the arrangement. 
 The privatization of water for the benefit of multinationals and some government officials 
at the expense of the citizens of the country is a perfect example neo-liberal economic priorities 
and it exemplifies the higher accountability of government to international financial institutions 
than to their own citizens.  Resistance to these policies by working and poor people who will suffer 
the consequences is both crucial and inevitable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Emerging Movement Against the Privatization of Water 
 
The Coalition 
 The GNCAPW was formed upon the initiative of ISODEC, an NGO involved in the 
provision of water and sanitation services in low income communities since 1984.  ISODEC 
organized a conference in May 2001, inviting the participation of other NGOs concerned with 
water issues, activists from other African countries, the United States and Europe as well as key 
players in the water privatization process including the Water Restructuring Secretariat, the 
Minister of Works and Housing and the World Bank representative of Ghana, all of whom 
presented their position on the issue.  At the end of the conference organizations and individuals in 
opposition to the privatization of water issued a statement known as the “Accra Declaration”, 
outlining their fundamental position that water is a right not a commodity and its privatization 
would only serve to jeopardize the ability of the poor to access safe water.  The statement calls 
upon government agencies, parliament, and international financing institutions to address the 
problematic nature of water privatization.56  The “Accra Declaration” was released over the 
internet and calls on organizations and individuals to write letters to the above pro-privatization 
institutions.  This marked the beginning of a signature campaign, with approximantly 70 
organisations initially signing on.57
 The campaign against water privatization began to expand to the grassroots level in 
September 2001 when new activists were incorporated into the campaign and subsequently 
focused their energies on developing awareness, debate and mobilization among workers, students, 
low income neighbourhood, women’s rights advocates and faith based organizations on the issue 
of water privatization on the issue of water privatization.58  This is significant because not only do 
the above sections of society stand to suffer most from the problematic nature of water 
privatization but they also include groups with potential for generating social change. 
 The GNCAPW is divided geographically with the southern sector representing the Volta, 
Eastern, GAR, Central and Western regions.  A Coordinating Committee (SCC) directs regional 
activities, however the most active structures organisationally are the Local Action Committee 
(LACs) based out of communities and workplaces.  Campaign activities include a signature 
campaign through which they outreach and make contracts, community meetings which serve 
educational organisational functions, water rallies which bring public attention to the issue and 
lobbying elected presentatives.59  CAPW utilizes the radio and print media and even take out ads in 
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the paper if there is critical information to put out.60  CAPW additionally produces their own 
leaflets.  The coalition has also solicited the support of journalists through educational meetings 
and forums.  The coalition utilizes fundraising for additional outreach by combing activities such 
as t-shirt sales with the signature campaign.  CAPW seeks to fund their activities domestically 
through member subscriptions and donations.61
 Future CAPW activities include the formalization of registration of members and affiliates, 
the organisation of new LACs and the creation of a central office from which to systematize 
materials and coordinate activities.62
 
 
Actors within the campaign: 
 
Workers: 
 The strength of the coalition hinges on the support of organized labour, because their 
control over the means of production gives them bargaining power with government.  As 
demonstrated above, the force of organized labour has been pivotal to the outcome of policy 
disputes since colonial times. 
 Most working people face difficulties with the increasing tariffs inherent in the water 
privatization deal.  The Public Utilities workers in particular stand to lose from the pending 
privatization as only 50 of 3,800 workers are assured of future employment.  The government 
promises the re-employment of 2,000 PUWU workers in other areas however their track record is 
poor: of 946 workers in the last retrenchment only 87 have been re-employed.63
 Members of the coalition and workers in factories in Tema and Accra have met to discuss 
the issue of water privatization, relating it to other issues such as the casualisation of labour.  The 
reaction from workers has proved fruitful.  The discourse within PUWU workers took a strong 
stance against restructuring of the water sector.  This is a departure from the past because although 
this is not the harshest retrenchment utility workers have faced in recent years it is the first time 
workers have decisively opposed the retrenchment itself, instead of attempting to negotiate the 
most beneficial severance package possible.64  Workers agreed to come out in opposition to water 
privatization on October 3rd, and the TUC leadership declared its official position against the 
privatization of water the following day.  The TUC leadership also attributes their interest in the 
campaign to their concern with related issues such as the WTO and the privatization of other 
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utilities namely the telecom and electricity corporations, issues they have discussed with labour 
organizations around the world.65
 Hence though young, mobilization among workers is significant because the initiative 
comes from the rank and file.66  As one TUC officer stated “It has the potential of being the issue 
that mobilizes a cross section of people more than any other issue in recent times”.67  This thought 
has added weight considering the strategic location of workers in Accra and Tema, urban areas that 
directly face the consequences of water privatization. 
 
Students: 
 Students have historically played a prominent role in the political process of Ghana.  ths is 
apparent from their catalytic role in the independence movement, in their prominence in fighting 
against undemocratic regimes and their presence in solidarity with workers struggles.  Students are 
an important constituency because of the status of university graduates and they influence they 
have no their home communities.68  It is from the universities that the political class emerges, and 
universities are the breeding grounds for future activists.  “When we speak they listen and they 
dare not ignore our voice.”69
 A range of SAP policies that entails large cuts in social services directly impact students, 
indeed the main issues students have organized around in recent years have been the introduction 
of fees and loans.  If water is privatized that will cause a significant increase in students RFUF 
which is already a problematic payment for many.  University students already have bad 
experiences with the privatization of social services reasons to be suspicious of the deals going on 
concerning water.70
 CAPW began to work among students in September 2001, organizing several 
forums on campus, inviting guest speakers such as human rights activists and leaders in CAPW.  
Students themselves organized a demonstration in September.71
 Students comprise one of the most successful local action committees in the Legon 
area.  Larger meetings involve 15-20 students, including student leaders, affiliates of other political 
organizations such as the ISO and the Students Worker Solidarity Society, and individuals 
concerned with the issue.72
 However the most noteworthy gauge of student sentiments and potential to organize 
around the issue of water privatization was demonstrated by a talk organized at Akuafo Hall, 
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Legon campus by proponents of water privatization.  Posters advertising the conference claimed 
the event would discuss the pros and cons of water privatization.  Yet when students arrived at the 
talk the speakers consisted only of the “galaxy of pro-privateers”, everyone form the Restructuring 
Secretariat to the Minister of Works and Housing.73 Also prominent on the poster was the slogan 
“Idem 13” which is commonly known to man free food and drinks on campus, demonstrating the 
importance to the ministers of convincing students to come listen to their case in support of water 
privatization. 74  Activists with the coalition received notice of the meeting and arrived early to 
speak with students on their position, and when the floor opened to discussion the students ‘wiped 
the floor” of the privatization proponents, ending with the STC president mounting the stage and 
declaring that the student government’s official position was against the privatization of water.  
The strength of student’s anti-privatization feelings surprised even organizers within the coalition 
signifying that “The mood against privatization is both broader and deeper than out most 
optimistic assessment had led us to believe.  No doubt, this is attributable in important respects to 
some of the work we have done.  But it also shows that our campaign must hurry up to catch up 
and connect with this mood by organizing and strengthening it”75   
A more recent talk at Commonwealth Hall, Legon campus, which featured the Minister of 
Parliament for the district among others, reinforced the importance of the issue of water 
privatization among the student body.  Thought it was a Friday night during exam times several 
hundred students were in attendance.  Water privatization was one of the feature topics and the 
students in attendance met the pro-privatisation remarks of the ministers with loud opposition.76
 
Activists of Left Organisations: 
 The presence of individual activists of left organizations and the International Socialist 
Organisation (ISO) that joined in the work of CAPW since September is valuable.  Activists that 
have experience in previous campaigns are useful as educational tools in the movement because of 
their understanding of issue of water privatization and related globalization concerns.  Activists 
additionally have experience with networking on the grassroots level, working in a coalition and 
they have distinct contracts with activists in other countries.77  Some participants in coalition 
activities trace their involvement in the anti-privatization movement since 1983 when the current 
structural adjustment policy came into being.78
 As well as being some of the main organizers of the campaign certain figures on the left 
have spoken to newly forming bases in the communities, or at rallies. 
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NGOs: 
 As mentioned above, NGOs have played and have the potential to play a role within the 
coalition.  ISODEC initiated the coalition and countless NGOs (an updated list is not available) 
representing women and children’s advocates, health and environmental interests have signed on.  
NGOs representing special interests groups can serve at educational resources and speakers on 
their area of expertise.  NGOs can additionally provide links with affiliate organizations in other 
countries.79
 
Faith Based Organisations: 
 The vast majority of Ghanaian citizens participate in organized religion.  Thus religious 
organizations provide a valuable forum to engage in debate, education and mobilization around the 
issue of water privatization.  Faith based organizations have historically taken stances in political 
campaigns such as the return to civilian rule.80
 The coalition has dialoged with strategic churches and mosques in Accra and Tema, as well 
as presenting their position to large faith based organizations.81
 Several religious bodies have come out in support of the campaign based on their concern 
for the rights of their constituencies and the rights of the poor, one of the most visible being the 
Christian Coalition, which incorporates over 25 churches.  The Christian Coalition came out with a 
press release indicating their position which understands the right to water being a “God-given 
right to all people that dwell on this earth”, which would be jeopardized by its privatization.  The 
statement also demonstrates awareness of anti-water privatization in other parts of the world such 
as Bolivia.82  The Coalition was given materials such as a video on the May conference from 
ISODEC but they also attribute awareness on the issue from the participation of their leadership in 
international conferences on globalisation and literature on the subject in Christian publications.83
 
Community Organisations: 
 Community organizations are important in the construction of a strong grassroots network 
to mobilize around the issue of water privatization.  Community groups can draw connections 
between workers, the informal sector, churches, mosque and representatives of special interest 
groups such as health and education workers.84
 Central to the campaign is the organization of Local Action Committees (LACs) based on 
the assumption that the “people in a particular area, institution or workplace are usually best able 
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to decide what is best for their LAC in any particular situation.”  LACs register with the 
Coordinating Committee and agree on an area of operation.  LACs mobilize people in their area 
and affiliating with religious bodies or other interests types like health workers.  The most 
successful committees have formed in the Maamobi, Legon and Tema areas.85
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OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES: 
 
 The connection between water to the quality of life and human survival creates immense 
opportunities to rally widespread support and mobilization against water privatization.  The 
coalition has to date successfully maximized on this phenomena by refusing to engage in sectarian 
politics, “CAPW aims to involve the maximum number of people…because we believe that 
everyone has an interest in fighting against water privatization, whatever their views on any other 
issues.”86
 The general feeling of dissatisfaction with neo-liberal policies, which have led to a drop in 
the quality of life for increasing numbers of people, also creates fertile ground for the cultivation of 
a movement against the privatization of water.  Drawing from previous experience with neo-liberal 
policy has taught Ghanaians that multinationals are no “Father Christmas”, but profit motivated 
corporations who must not be trusted with the control of Ghana’s water.87  However the political 
climate of the aftermath of the 2000 elections creates difficulties for a campaign against water at 
this juncture.  The focus on electoral politics creates a “vacuum” of other forms of political activity 
and organization.  The left must “start all over…we are back to square one,” in the development of 
theory and the creation of activists networks.88  Additionally, the relatively recent return to 
“democratic” rule inhibits some people’s willingness to challenge government policy for fear of 
undermining the perceived fragile state democracy in Ghana.89
 Organizationally, the coalition’s strength lies the fact that key constituencies such as 
workers, students religious bodies and communities have begun to mobilize over the water.  Even 
more significant is the highly democratic and interactive manner in which discussion and action 
groups are operating.  The focus of energy to the grassroots facilitates people’s ability to prioritize 
their most urgent concerns and develop actions accordingly. 
 Furthermore, even in these early phases the coalition has managed to make connections 
with activists working on related globalisation issues such as the cyanide spills, the WTO rounds 
in Doha and the reviving jubilee 2000 movement.  Making such connections serves to generate 
ideas and alliances on water privatization and larger issues.90
 However the coalition also faces the immense challenge of giving organized outlets for the 
energies and sentiments against water privatization.  The coalition in its youth has yet to network 
among certain constituencies, and must continue to reaffirm and strengthen the commitment of key 
groups. 
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 Though the rank and file supports the anti-water privatization campaign and the TUC 
leadership announced its official position against the privatization deal, they have to date made no 
call to action over the water issue.  Their pro-active participation in the future is essential to the 
success of the campaign.91
 Another issue is the lack of women’s participation within the campaign.  While the 
coalition counts on the support of some women at the grassroots level in LACs and churches, there 
was a decided lack of women’s presence in many levels of the campaign: few women attend 
student meetings or head affiliate organizations.9293  Although the issue of women’s political 
participation is broader than the campaign itself, the coalition must exert constant vigilance in the 
effort to incorporate the active participation of women into decision-making processes and 
organizational activities. 
 The nature of the arena for debate presents challenges and opportunities for the coalition.  
In contrast to previous regimes, the coalition has all channels of media at their disposal, as well as 
the freedom of movement and association.  This creates the potential of developing alliances with 
journalists and utilizing the press and radio as educational and organizational tools.  Additionally, 
the government’s role in advocating the privatization of water through forums, articles, meetings 
and advertisements in some ways assists to perpetuate national interest on the issue.  Government 
attacks on the campaign, particularly their slander of ISODEC is a double edged sword.  If the 
coalition utilizes the attacks to assert the unity and prominence of the coalition above any of its 
individual members, then the government’s attacks may only give the coalition greater legitimacy 
to represent a broad cross-section of the population.94
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CONCLUSION 
 
 Despite its short existence the movement emerging to address the impending privatization 
of water has begun to create a dynamic and diverse alliance with political potential. 
 It is too early to deduce what implications this step in neo-liberal economic policy will 
bode for the governments’ ability to maintain legitimacy in the eyes of Ghanaian citizens.  
However it can be noted that the topic of water privatization has sparked great controversy and 
resistance, indicating the potential for tense developments. 
 How the movement will affect the future of water policy in Ghana remains to be seen.  Yet 
the challenge to the water privatization process has already caused the government to tread more 
carefully as evidenced by the postponement of the next tariff increases.  More importantly, the 
mobilization around the water issue is creating a forum for the development of ideas and a tool for 
political expression among largely disenfranchised groups.  Hence the struggle against water 
privatization is valuable not only for its ability to defend a valuable social commodity but for 
developing peoples ability to defend, express and demand their rights.  Also, the beginning of the 
cross-dialogue between activists involved in related struggles show the potential for people to 
make connections between policies and form a broader political perspective.  These developments 
are crucial in face of the void of spaces to advocate for alternatives to the current neo-liberal model 
which gives no room for democracy, equity or self determination. 
 
Suggestions for Further Study: 
 This paper addresses the developments, potentials and significance of a newly forming 
social movement.  Further study into the progression of the developing coalition and its activities 
could add to a better understanding of the relevance of the anti-water privatization movement in 
Ghana as well as shedding further light onto the questions I was only able to answer partially. 
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ATTACHMENT B 
 
The Metropolitan Assemblies and Municipal Assemblies of the towns and cities listed below are 
not aware and have not 
 
Water Systems in  Business Unit A 
Upper East Upper West Northern Greater Accra Volta 
Bawku Tumu Gambaga Accra  Nkwanta 
Navrongo 
Bongo 
Lawra Walewale Amasaman Kete Krachi 
Zebila Jirapa Gashiegu Tema  Kadjebi 
Bolgatanga Nadawli Saboba  Ada Jasikan 
Sandema Wa Saveluga  Hohoe 
  Tolon  Kpandu 
  Tamale  Ho 
  Yendi  Akasti 
  Zabzugu  Adedome 
  Bimbilla   Sogakope 
  Damongo  Denu 
  Bolo  Keta 
  Salaga   
5 5 13 4 12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Water Systems in Business Unit B 
 
 
Western Central Eastern Brong-Ahafo Ashanti 
Juabeso Dunkwa Donkorkrom Kintampo Ejura 
Wiawso Fosu Mpraeso Wenchi Mampong 
Enchi Twifo Praso New Aberim Atebubu Offinso 
Asankragwa Asikuma Begro Kwame Danso Anona 
Tarkwa Swedru Kibi Kete Krachi Effiduase 
Daboase Ejumako Kade Techiman Mankranso 
Half Assini Abura Suhum Nkoranza Kumasi 
Axim Dunkwa Akim Oda Drobo Ejisu 
Nkwanta Winneba  Nsawam Domma 
Ahenkro 
Kuntansase 
Takoradi Saltpond Dodowa Sunyani Juaso 
 Cape Coast Akropong Bechem Bekwai 
 Elmina Somanya Kenyasi No. 1 Nkwanta 
  Atemposu Tepa Manso 
   Goaso Obuasi 
    New Edubiase 
    On-Offin 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
WHY MUST PRIVATIZATION IN GHANA MUST BE 
STOPPED 
In the interest of two transnational corporations, vested interests
in Ghana, foreign governments and the World Bank conspire to
violate our Right to water. 
Water is Life. 
 
BUSINESS 
UNIT B 
 
 
REGIONS 
Central 
Eastern 
Western 
Ashanti 
Brong Ahafo 
 
 
TERM OF LEASE 
10 Years 
 
BIDDERS
Bi-Water-British 
Nuon- Dutch 
Generale Des’Eaux- French
Skanska - Swedish 
 
 
 
 
NUMBER OF CITIES 
73 Years 
 
 
POPULATION NOW 
3.9 million 
 
 
INVESTMENT 
REQUIRED 
US$ 467 Million 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BUSINESS 
UNIT A 
 
 
REGIONS 
Greater Accra 
Volta 
Northern 
Upper East 
Upper West 
 
 
BIDDERS
Northumbrian – British 
Vivendi – French 
SAUR – French 
 
 
TERM OF LEASE 
30 Years 
 
 
NUMBER OF CITIES 
27 Years 
 
 
POPULATION NOW 
3.6 million 
 
 
INVESTMENT 
REQUIRED 
US$ 1.351 billion 
